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Joseph W. McKnight *
I. STATUS
A. Presumed Validity of Marriage
NDER section 2.01 of the Family Code1 a particular spouse's mostUrecent marriage is presumed to be valid, and the burden of proof is
Uupon a contestant to demonstrate the validity of a prior marriage.
In Wilkins v. Wilkins 2 the ex-husband brought a bill of review to set aside a
1973 divorce in which the court awarded a part of his retirement benefits to
his ex-wife. The petitioner asserted that the divorce should be set aside be-
cause the 1950 California marriage the bill sought to dissolve was itself void
because the wife was then married to someone else. To demonstrate circum-
stantially that the earlier marriage was still subsisting in 1950 and for many
years afterward, the petitioner showed that his wife's former husband had
sued her for divorce in California in 1945 and again in 1961. The first com-
plaint was dismissed in 1957 for failure to prosecute, but no disposition of
the second suit was indicated. The former husband, however, was also
shown to have died and was survived by a widow other than the woman who
had married the petitioner. The ex-wife testified that she thought she was
divorced from her former husband when she married the petitioner. The
trial court concluded that the petitioner had not borne the heavy burden of
proving that his ex-wife had not been divorced from her prior husband. The
appellate decision does not state whether the former husband died before the
divorce in 1973. Although the petitioner's evidence of the first husband's
two suits for divorce suggests that the earlier marriage was still subsisting at
the time of the marriage in 1950, the petitioner did not show the domicile of
the first husband from the time of his separation from his first wife in 1944.
The former husband might have successfully sued his wife for divorce at
some other domicile prior to the 1950 marriage, but the two successive suits
for divorce brought in 1945 and 1961 demonstrate the great improbability
that he did so. Although neither party appears to have raised the point, if
* B.A., University of Texas; M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author thanks Bruce Hen-
drick for his assistance in preparing this article.
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975).
2. No. 04-89-00517-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ), 3 Family Law Forum
7 (no. 8, Sept. 1990).
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the former husband had died before the divorce in 1973, under section 2.223
the parties' subsisting relationship could have become an informal marriage
during the interval prior to the divorce.
. Informal Marriage
In a divorce case4 heard on appeal by the Fort Worth court, the petitioner
alleged an informal marriage which the respondent denied. Pending trial,
the court ordered the respondent to support an alleged child of the marriage.
Denying paternity as well as the marriage, the respondent sought a declara-
tion of non-paternity and restitution of the child-support payments. When
the matter came to trial the petitioner moved for a non-suit, and the court
dismissed the entire case. 5 The respondent appealed from the dismissal of
his claims for affirmative relief. The appellate court held that the respon-
dent's claims for affirmative relief could not be foreclosed, but in the absence
of any finding by the trial court, the appellate court was precluded frbm
making a declaration with respect to validity of the informal marriage. 6
C. Emotional Distress
In Chiles v. Chiles7 the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a
spouse could not maintain a cause of action for emotional distress along with
a cause of action for divorce.8 In that case, the emotional distress com-
plained of arose from the husband's activities with other women but with a
degree of secrecy. On the other hand, in Twyman v. Twyman, 9 where the
wife's emotional distress arose from the husband's insistence on having un-
conventional sexual relations with her, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed
an award for damages for infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with
a decree for divorce.' 0 Although the court in Twyman refers to the hus-
band's negligent infliction of injury, the facts indicate a willful course of con-
duct directed toward the wife that was in no sense negligent but in a very
real sense involved willful acts, coercively imposed.
A logical impasse has been reached in analyzing the propriety of granting
a divorce and also in awarding damages for physical or mental injury that
make a marriage unreconcilable. This situation stems from a line of three
Texas Supreme Court cases" in which the court seemed to have assumed
that, by removing the interspousal immunity to suit, one spouse could be
liable to the other spouse just as though the couple were not married. But as
3. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1975).
4. Page v. Page, 780 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
8. Id. at 131.
9. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
10. Id. at 822-23. The court stated that the doctrine of interspousal immunity had been
abolished in Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).
11. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.
1987); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
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long as immunity to suit existed, courts made no determination whether or
in what circumstances oa cause of action existed on behalf of one spouse
against another. Merely removing the status-bar to suit between the spouses
does not, in itself, establish a cause of action for any sort of grievance that
may exist between them.
The first 12 of the three cases that came before the Texas Supreme Court
was the most difficult. There, children sued their mother's husband who had
willfully shot and killed her. As in other cases of wrongful death, the cause
of action was derivative and thus the victim must have had a cause of action
so that her heirs could recover. 13 The court's concern was principally fo-
cused on putting aside the interspousal immunity doctrine. 14 Once that was
accomplished, it was assumed without any discussion that the wife would
have had a cause of action for willful assault by her husband.15 Whether she
might have coupled such a claim with a suit for divorce was, of course, not
before the court. In the two subsequent cases, 16 in somewhat different pro-
cedural contexts, the Texas Supreme Court conchded that a spouse might
recover for injury inflicted by the negligence of the other spouse.17 In both
instances, the spouses sought damages in the context of a divorce proceed-
ing, but it was not noted whether the facts supporting the causes of action
for injury may have been related to the marital breakdown or how much
time had elapsed since the acts were committed.
One of the great failings of the system of legal development by judicial
decision is that a general analysis of the subject is not undertaken until the
process has gone so far that future development by logical extension may be
foreordained. In this instance, extension of the principle of spousal liability
to all cases of divorce may occur unless the Texas Supreme Court reexam-
ines the entire subject.
D. Privileged Testimony
No so long ago a spouse was deemed incompetent to testify against the
other spouse in most criminal prosecutions.' 8 Today the admissability of
spousal evidence with respect to events which occurred during marriage is a
matter of privilege19 rather than competence, but the privilege also extends
12. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
13. Id. at 926.
14. Id. at 926-27.
15. Id. at 927.
16. Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987); Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.
1987).
17. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d at 16 (court stated that it need not address issue of
negligence action); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d at 318-20 (court stated that arguments for and
against interspousal immunity are equally applicable to intentional and negligent tort cases).
18. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 600-601 (Chadbourne rev. 1979), 8 J. WIGMORE
EVIDENCE §§ 2227-2228 (Chadbourne rev. 1978).
19. An assertion of privilege should ordinarily be made beyond the hearing of the jury,
but the state may show that it is not practicable to allow a spouse to invoke the privilege
outside the presence of the jury. TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 513(b); see Johnson v. State, No. 70-
177 (rex. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 1990) (Lexis, Tex. library, Tex. Crim. App. file).
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to a prospective witness who is no longer married to the accused. 20
Although the rules of criminal evidence now allow a former spouse to testify
against a prisoner,21 even though the offense occurred before the adoption of
those rules and while the spouses were married,22 divorce does not terminate
the privilege for confidential communications made during marriage.23 This
privilege, however, extends only to utterances made by the accused and not
to his customary behavior, such as habitually carrying a weapon. 24 Addi-
tionally, the confidential communications privilege allows an accused spouse
to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication made to
his or her spouse while they were married. The privilege, however, only
extends to communications made privately to the spouse and not intended to
be disclosed to any other person.25 As the rules now stand, the testimonial
privilege allows the spouse of a decendent to testify voluntarily for the state
over the objections of the accused, provided that the testimony does not vio-
late the rules for privileged communications. 26
E. Interspousal Guardianship and Agency
When it is necessary to appoint a guardian for an adult, that adult's
spouse has a statutory preference with certain exceptions. 27 One of the stat-
utory disqualifications includes being a party to a suit in which the prospec-
tive ward is also a party.23 This ground for disqualification lends itself to
little, if any, judicial interpretation. 29 Statutory disqualifications are based
on actual or potential conflicts of interest between the guardian and ward,
but at least one court has found another conflict of interest not specifically
defined by the statute. 30 Although no appellate court has pointedly ad-
dressed the problem, it appears that if a spousal guardian is engaged in unau-
thorized self-dealing in handling the ward's affairs, the guardian would hold
personal gains in trust for those who benefit by operation of law or those
meant by the ward to benefit. A somewhat analogous situation was recently
adjudicated 3' in connection with the administration of a non-terminable
power of attorney under section 36A of the Probate Code. 32 Although the
agent in In re Estate of Crawford33 was the principal's child rather than her
husband, the results would have been the same in the case of a spousal
20. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
21. Id.
22. See Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1990, no
writ).
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id.
25. Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
26. Id. at 893.
27. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 109(c)(1) (Vernon 1980).
28. Id. § 110(d).
29. Mireles v. Alvarez, 789 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
30. See Dobrowolski v. Wyman, 397 S.W.2d 930, 932 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1965, no writ).
31. In re Estate of Crawford, 795 S.W.2d 835 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
32. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980).
33. 795 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
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agency. Although the decision is based on the narrow and artificial argu-
ment that the agent's disposition of securities was not completed prior to the
decedent's death because a new certificate had not yet been issued to the
purchaser, the intended beneficiary of the principal should be protected from
an unauthorized act of the agent who rearranges the principal's succession.3 4
If the agent is guilty of unauthorized self-dealing by diverting the principal's
estate from the principal's intended beneficiary to himself, the agent would
hold the assets as a constructive trustee for the intended beneficiary.35
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Premarital and Marital Partitions
Prior to their marriage in 1977, a couple entered into a premarital agree-
ment stating that all property, including deposits in bank accounts standing
in the name of either, would be the separate property of the spouse in whose
name it stood. After the husband's death in 1981, the wife asserted that the
funds accumulated in her bank accounts were her separate property in ac-
cordance with the agreement. At the time that the agreement was entered
into, the Texas Constitution provided that a "husband and wife... may...
by written instrument.., partition between themselves.., all or any part of
their existing community property, or exchange between themselves the
community interest of one spouse for the community interest of the other
spouse in other community property ..... " 36The Dallas Court of Appeals
held in Beck v. Beck 37 that this provision allowed the exchange of future
acquisitions of income so that all the earnings in the wife's accounts as well
as those of the husband would be the separate property of the spouse in
whose name the accounts stood.
In weighing the necessity of amending the Texas Constitution to allow the
partition or exchange of future marital profits, the draftsmen of 1979 dis-
cussed the prospect of convincing an appellate court that the provision with
respect to exchange was so isolated from the provision for partition of "ex-
isting community property" that the court could hold (as the Dallas court
recently did) that the transaction was valid as an exchange of future acquisi-
tions. No one thought that such an argument had the remotest prospect of
success. If anyone had then taken such an argument seriously, it would not
have been necessary to amend the Constitution in 1980.38 After the amend-
ment of the Constitution in 1948, the bench and bar had interpreted the
reference to community interest in the exchange provisions as applying an
34. See Marschall, Council Proposes New Legislation Authorizing a Power of Attorney Not
Terminated by Disability, 7 State Bar of Texas Newsletter of the Real Estate, Probate & Trust
Law Section 6 (no. 3, 1969); cf McKnight, Objections to the Council Proposal for New Legisla-
tion Authorizing a Power of Attorney Not Terminable by Disability, id. at 6-7.
35. Crawford, 795 S.W.2d at 841.
36. Tax. CONS. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, amended 1948).
37. 792 S.W.2d 813, 817-18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
38. Very reasonably, the point is not mentioned in Comment, The Uniform Premarital




"existing" community interest as specifically stated in the preceding parti-
tion provision.
The Corpus Christi appellate court's error in Grossman v. Grossman 39 is
even more egregious. Overlooking the fact that a premarital partition to
change the character of marital acquisition could not have been validly
agreed until the Constitution was amended in 1980, the court relied on the
new text of section 5.4640 enacted in 1987 to fix the burden of proof and
therefore the validity of a 1974 pre-marital partition41 involved in a 1989
divorce proceeding.
In McBride v. McBride42 the husband and wife had entered into a written
agreement compromising a suit for divorce in 1982, and the suit was dis-
missed. The husband agreed to support the wife from his separate property
and to make her the beneficiary of his interest in the community estate in his
will. The wife agreed that if she should again seek a divorce, she would
forfeit her right to any interest in their community property. The husband
also agreed to convey his house to the wife and to transfer a car to her. Both
of these provisions were executed. The wife later sued for divorce and
sought a declaration that the prior agreement was void. The husband as-
serted that the agreement constituted a valid partition of marital property.
The majority of the Fourteenth District appellate court concluded that the
agreement did not constitute a partition under the Family Code as it stood in
1982 because the partition there referred to contemplated a division of prop-
erty rather than a forfeiture of property contingent upon the happening of a
future event.43 Chief Justice Brown would have upheld the validity of the
agreement. "The parties entered into this settlement agreement voluntarily.
The agreement expressly states that the parties understood that the contract
altered their present and future property rights. Both partners were repre-
sented by counsel." 44 Broadly viewed, the agreement is construable as a
partition of the parties' marital estate,45 though it is contingent on the wife's
bringing a suit for divorce, at which time she consummates the exchange.
Although somewhat unusual, allowing a future event to control the partition
is not beyond the purview of the constitutional right conferred on spouses to
characterize their property interests.
B. Rebutting the Community Property Presumption
All property acquired during marriage or held at the termination of the
39. 799 S.W.2d 511 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
40. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.46 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
41. Grossman, 799 S.W.2d at 513.
42. 797 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
43. Id. at 692.
44. Id. at 694. The Chief Justice also said that the wife was estopped from contesting the
validity of the agreement because she had not offered to return the substantial benefits she had
received under the contract. Id.
45. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, amended 1980). The Constitution specifically an-
ticipates the partition of both present community property and future acquisitions that would
otherwise be community property and does not limit the partition to the community estate.
[Vol. 45
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marriage is presumed to be community property.46 The burden of proof of a
separate interest acquired during marriage or prior to marriage must be
borne by the claimant.4 7 The presumption itself is not evidence,49 but clear
and convincing evidence is required to rebut it.49 Hence, the introduction of
merely probative evidence of separate character may not suffice to shift the
burden of going forward with proof unless the quality of that evidence is
clear and convincing.50
In Saldana v. Saldana5 the dispute centered on the characterization of
realty that the husband's mother had conveyed to him and his wife for a
recited nominal consideration. The husband's position was that the convey-
ance was meant as neither a sale nor a gift,52 but as a mere accommodation
to help the couple negotiate a loan to build a house on the property and that
the couple was therefore holding the property for the husband's mother.53
The wife testified that she paid the $10 recited consideration to the grantor 54
with what were presumptively community funds.55 The appellate court con-
cluded that the conveyance constituted community property but noted,
somewhat apologetically, that the result would not have been changed if the
conveyance had been characterized as a gift to both spouses in equal shares,
because the trial court had divided the property equally between them. 56
In Welder v. Welder 57 the husband sought to show that certain real prop-
erty bought during marriage was his separate pr6perty because he intended
to pay for it with his separate property at the time it was acquired. 58 The
purchase was largely on credit, however, and it was not clear that the seller
looked solely to his separate property to discharge the debt.5 9 The court's
comment that "the intention of the spouses is the primary consideration af-
46. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
47. Premarital acquisitions are easily shown to be separate property. See Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 791 S.W.2d 659, 667 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) (car acquired prior to
marriage but paid for in part with community funds). Wasting elements of separate property
are also easily shown to be separate property. See Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d 420, 425
(Trex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (oil royalty from separate property).
48. See J. McKNIOHT & W. REPPY, TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 31 (1983);
see also Neece v. Neece, No. 02-89-092 CV, unpub'd (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
49. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
50. For comments on the prior law, see J. McKNIoHT & W. REPPY, supra note 48, at 31-
32; Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d 524, 530 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
51. 791 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
52. Id. at 318. In Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d 420, 431-432 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1990, no writ), an argument of gift between the spouses was made and rejected.
53. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d at 318-19; cf. Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 208 (rex. 1974)
(account in form of joint tenancy account found to be mere convenience account).
54. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d at 320.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see Halamka v. Halamka, 799 S.W.2d 351, 354 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no
writ) (court of general jurisdiction may partition spouses' separate interests on divorce).
57. 794 S.W.2d 420 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
58. Id. at 427.
59. The seller's or lender's agreement to look only to the buyer's or borrower's separate
property for payment causes the property to be bought or borrowed to be separate property.
Broussard v. Tian, 156 Tex. 371, 373, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406 (1956); Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex.
606, 612, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (1937); see Ray v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 372, 377 (S.D.
Tex. 1974), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1228, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976).
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fecting the community or separate nature of property acquired with bor-
rowed funds"' ° is clearly mistaken. In the course of its comments, the court
also tolerated some extremely dubious notions of fund-tracing, 61 including
adherence to the principle that withdrawals from a fund containing deposits
of both separate and community property are deemed to be community
property without reference to the purpose of withdrawal. 62
C. Reimbursement
Although it was once said that a spouse is allowed to spend as much time
as deemed necessary to manage his or her separate property, 63 the court
refined the rule in Jensen v. Jensen 64 to allow a spouse as much time as is
reasonably necessary to maintain the separate estate, but such time as is nec-
essary to make the separate estate productive is subject to a community right
of reimbursement. 65
A type of claim more commonly encountered arises from an expenditure
by one marital estate for the benefit of another. In Gutierrez v. Gutierrez66
the San Antonio Court of Appeals restated the Texas Supreme Court's com-
ment in Penick v. Penick 67 that the rules for reimbursement are the same for
payments made by one marital estate for another as for improvements made
by one marital estate for another. 68 Thus, the measure of reimbursement is
the amount that the benefited estate has been enhanced. Neither court, how-
ever, explained how enhancement is measured in the case of discharge of a
monetary obligation, whether or not secured by a lien on the property. The
situation is illustrated by a point not resolved in Gutierrez with respect to a
car bought on credit prior to marriage. The car was therefore separate prop-
erty and the note for payment was discharged with community funds during
marriage while the car was depreciating in value. By a strict application of
the enhancement standard announced in Anderson v. Gilliland,69 reimburse-
ment is based on the depreciated value of the car and not on the actual
amount of money expended.
To secure the payment of an award for reimbursement, a court may im-
pose a lien on benefited realty. 70 In the broad context of divorce, the court
60. Welder, 794 S.W.2d at 426.
61. Id. at 425-26. An application of the standard rules of tracing when separate or com-
munity fungibles are commingled is illustrated by Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 791 S.W.2d 659,
665-66 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) (herd of livestock).
62. Welder, 794 S.W.2d at 433-34; see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 115, 124 (1980).
63. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 499, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953).
64. 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984); see Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 791 S.W.2d 659, 665
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
65. This rule is somewhat misstated in Welder. 794 S.W.2d at 425.
66. 791 S.W.2d 659 (rex. App.--San Antonio 1990, no writ).
67. 783 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1988). In his concurring opinion Justice Cook promised
amplification of the subject on motion for rehearing. Id. at 198. Time evidently did not allow
for a further explanation.
68. Gutierrez, 791 S.W.2d at 663.
69. 684 S.W.2d 673, 675 (rex. 1985).
70. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 881-82 (rex. 1984). In Jensen v. Jen-
(Vol. 45
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sometimes imposes a money judgment on one of the spouses or puts a lien on
the realty of one of them to equalize shares in the division of the community
estate.71 Although some difference of opinion exists concerning this point,72
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals would also allow a divorce court to put a
lien on realty other than that benefited, including non-exempt separate prop-
erty, in order to secure the payment of reimbursement."3
D. Agreement for Survivorship to Community Property
Although no appellate court has had occasion to interpret the 1987 consti-
tutional amendment 74 or the implementing legislation of 1989, 75 the profes-
sional literature on the subject continues76 to stress the pitfalls inherent in
spousal agreements for survivorship to community property.77
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILrrY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Spousal Agreement for Sole Management of Community Property
Family Code section 5.2278 provides for management of community prop-
erty on the basis of its source. Subsections (b) and (c), however, specifically
provide that the spouses may alter those management rights by an agree-
ment which need not be in writing.79 When such an alleged agreement is not
in writing, the courts face the difficulty of evaluating the acts and apparent
intentions of the parties in order to determine whether the spouses reached
an agreement. Under section 5.22(b), 80 if the spouses mix or combine their
solely managed community property, joint management of the properties is
required by operation of law in the absence of any agreement to the con-
trary. In Brooks v. Sherry Lane Nat'l Bank"1 the husband's creditor gar-
nished funds in an account that the wife asserted was subject to her sole
management. The account was one in which the wife's separate property
and her solely managed community were deposited, though the names of
both spouses were on the account and the husband had written several
sen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984), the court said that imposition of a lien on personalty
was inappropriate.
71. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw.
L.J. 1, 34-35 (1989); Mullins v. Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5, 11-12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990,
no writ).
72. See Smith v. Smith, 715 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ).
73. Mullins v. Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5, 12 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
74. Tax. CONsr. art. XVI, § 15 (1876, as amended 1987).
75. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-462 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
76. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw.
L.J. 1, 12 n.83 (1990).
77. See Virden, Joint Tenancy with Right of Surivorship & Community Property with
Right of Survivorship, 53 TEx. BAR J. 1179 (1990); Quilliam, A Requiem for Hiley: Is Survi-
vorship Community Property a Solution Worse Than the Problem, 21 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1153
(1990).
78. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).
79. See LeBlanc v. Waller, 603 S.W.2d 265, 267 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, no writ).
80. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (Vernon 1975).
81. 788 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
1991]
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checks on the account under circumstances not explained in the opinion.
The court concluded that the spouses "may have intended that [the wife]
own the account as [her solely managed] community property, but this in-
tent, voiced prior to opening the account, is superseded by the subsequent
opening of the joint account with its joint right of control.18 2 The fact of the
spouses' tacit agreement was the central issue before the court. Although
each party moved for summary judgment, the wife also sought to show a
material issue of fact to preclude the success of the other movant's motion, if
her own motion failed. The trial court granted the opposing summary judg-
ment and the appellate court concluded that because of the state of the
pleadings, there was an insufficient showing of a material fact in issue.8 3
In Owen v. Porter84 a creditor of the husband intervened in the couple's
suit for divorce to reach certain items of community property as subject to
the husband's sole, or the couple's joint, management. The couple had
agreed orally that certain realty in the husband's name and a note made to
the husband would be the wife's separate property and that she might collect
the rent from the realty and the interest on the note for her support and that
of the children. The wife collected those sums but deposited them to a joint
account. The trial court, nevertheless, found that the realty and note were
subject to the wife's sole management. The appellate court found this con-
clusion untenable.85 First, the court held that for lack of writing the agree-
ment failed as a partition under section 5.5486 or as an agreement incident to
divorce under section 3.631.87 Further, because the apparent agreement be-
tween the spouses did not give the wife power to dispose of the realty or the
note, which was unendorsed,88 no agreement as to the wife's sole manage-
ment of those properties had been reached.8 9 The court's handling of the
facts in both Brooks and Owen shows the application of a stricter standard of
proof than that applied in LeBlanc v. Waller.90
B. Interspousal Liability
Acting alone, either spouse can incur contractual liability that will bind
the share of the non-contracting spouse's community property subject to the
sole or joint control of the contracting spouse, but the non-contracting
spouse is not personally liable for the obligation. Thus Texas law stood from
January 1, 1968 when the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 became effec-
tive, but because of so much confusion on the point, it was necessary to
codify the rule in Family Code section 4.03191 in 1987. In Carr v. Houston
82. Id. at 877.
83. Id. at 878.
84. 796 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
85. Id. at 267-68.
86. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.54 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Owen, 796 S.W.2d at 268.
88. Owen, 796 S.W.2d at 269.
89. Id.
90. 603 S.W.2d 265, 267-68. (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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Business Forms, Inc.92 a printing firm with which the husband had con-
tracted for services sued the husband and his wife for the unpaid work. The
trial court rendered judgement against both spouses; and the wife appealed.
The Houston appellate court held that section 4.031 was clearly applicable
to all judgments rendered after November 1, 1987, and that the wife was,
therefore, not liable for the husband's contract.93 Along the way, however,
the court made some misleading comments with respect to a non-contracting
spouse's implied assent to the other spouse's contracts.94 Section 4.031 pro-
vides that a non-contracting spouse for whom the other spouse is not acting
as an agent is not liable for the obligation contracted by the other spouse
except with respect to necessaries. No implied assent is present, therefore,
on the part of the non-contracting spouse except to confirm an undisclosed
existing agency.
Although all community property is liable for a tort committed by either
spouse, 95 no interspousal agency exists merely by virtue of marriage that
causes the torts of one spouse to be attributed to the other.96 Hence, no
personal liability of one spouse for the tortious activities of the other spouse
occurs in the absence of a demonstrated agency. In State Farm Lloyds, Inc.
v. Williams97 suit was brought against the estates of a husband and wife for
the wrongful death of several persons shot by the husband just before he shot
himself and his wife. The heirs of the victims sought recovery from a com-
munity homeowner's policy which insured "personal liability" of the home-
owner. By its terms, therefore, the policy did not cover the liability sought
to be imposed on the wife's estate.93
C. Execution Sale
Community property subject to joint management of the spouses is subject
to liability incurred by either spouse. On occasions, however, when the
court does not order execution on specific property, a levying officer has
shown some resistance to making a levy of execution on property held in the
name of both spouses when the judgment runs against only one of them.99
Gensheimer v. Kneisley 1o concerned a foreclosure of an abstract of judg-
ment rather than a levy of execution, but the decision should go some way
toward relieving the anxiety of a hesitant levying officer.10' In May, the
husband and wife conveyed land to a grantee who failed to record his title.
In September a plaintiff was awarded a money judgment against the husband
92. 794 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1990, no writ).
93. Id. at 852.
94. Id. at 851-52.
95. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
96. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
97. 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
98. Id. at 545-46.
99. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw.
L.J. 131, 145-46 (1984).
100. 778 S.W.2d 138 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
101. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 85.021 (Vernon 1988) (officer's liability for failure to
levy as directed) may also provide effective encouragement.
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and at the end of October an abstract of judgment was filed against him.
The abstract of judgment lien on the property previously sold was then fore-
closed. The plaintiff had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and
received a sheriff's deed. The day after the plaintiff abstracted his judgment,
the grantee recorded his conveyance. The plaintiff brought an action in tres-
pass to try title to the property and was awarded a summary judgment. On
appeal the grantee argued that because the plaintiff's judgment did not ex-
tend to the wife, the abstract of judgment would not reach the whole of the
property. The appellate court rejected this argument by a literal reading of
section 5.61(c).10 2 The plaintiff who had no notice of the prior sale to the
grantee established a valid lien on all of the jointly held community realty by
his abstract of judgment against the husband only. 103
. Homestead: Designation and Extent
A domiciliary of Texas may claim an urban or a rural homestead but not
both.104 Once a homestead is established, its character as urban or rural
may be changed by alteration of population density in the area where the
home is located.' 0 5 The acreage protected from creditors' claims and the
amount of ad valorem taxes assessed differ radically as a result. A 1989
legislative amendment to Property Code section 41.002106 was meant to
serve the rural homestead claimant in both of these respects: "A homestead
is considered to be rural if, at the time that the designation is made, the
property is not served by municipal utilities and fire and police protec-
tion."'1 7 In this context the word designation is a term of art referring to
the time the property initially became a homestead.10  Thus, if the property
is rural when the homestead is established, it continues as a rural homestead,
until "served by municipal utilities and fire and police protection."'' 0 9 Fur-
ther, if a rural area is taken into a municipality, the rural homes located in
the area do not automatically become urban homesteads. That change con-
tinues to depend on the character of the region as either rural or urban.110
102. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975); Gensheimer, 778 S.W.2d at 140.
103. Gensheimer, 778 S.W.2d at 14041. But see TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 34.046 (Vernon 1986) (purchaser at sheriff's sale other than creditor protected as good faith
purchaser only if would have been so "had the sale been made voluntarily [by the debtor] and
in person").
104. Exall v. Sec. Mortgage & Trust Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 643, 39 S.W. 959, 960 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1897, writ ref'd); see In re Bohac, 117 Bankr. 256, 259-60 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990).
105. Lauchheimer & Sons v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 140-41, 76 S.W. 750, 751 (1903)
(change from rural to urban); In re Lee, 570 F.2d 1301, 1302 (5th Cir. 1978) (change from
urban to rural).
106. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
107. Id. § 41.002(c).
108. It is apparent from the context that the word designation and various forms of desig-
nate in TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.005, .021-.024 (Vernon Supp. 1991) indicate a different
meaning in those provisions.
109. Id.
110. Jones v. First Nat'l Bank of McAllen, 259 S.W. 157, 159 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924,
judgm't adopted); Vistron Corp. v. Winstead, 521 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1975, no writ).
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But even if the region is factually urban, the change of homestead type now
is precluded when the legislative restriction applies. Again, the test of
changed circumstances is factual. When the property can be served with
both types of municipal services, the homestead claimant may defer the
change by declining to accept utility service when that option is available. A
choice with respect to fire and police protection does not appear to be open
to the claimant; the prompt availability of those services seems to be the
controlling factor.
Once homestead character affixes to property, that characteristic contin-
ues until the property is abandoned as a homestead. 11 Because a claimant
of a homestead can have only one homestead at a time, a new homestead
cannot be established until the prior homestead has been abandoned. 112
Thus, if the claimant maintains an existing homestead by continued resi-
dence there, a new homestead cannot be acquired even though the claimant
may intend to move and readies the new premises for occupancy preparatory
to moving. 113
When a spouse is deprived of homestead occupancy by a divorce decree,
the homestead right is not abandoned by virtue of that fact alone. As com-
monly happens, the continuing owner of a fractional undivided interest in
the former family home will establish a new home, and the prior homestead
right is therefore lost. But if a new homestead is not acquired and the ex-
spouse given occupancy of the property abandons it, the dispossessed ex-
spouse may reenter and continue the suspended homestead right. 14 In In re
Johnson 1 1 5 the wife separated from her husband and moved out of the com-
munity home. A year later a divorce was granted to her, and the homestead
property was divided equally between the spouses. The ex-husband was
awarded occupancy of the home in order to sell it. The ex-wife later filed for
bankruptcy and claimed her half interest in the house as exempt property.
She testified that it was agreed that the husband would occupy the house for
the time being, but that if he should vacate the house, she would have the
right to reoccupy it. She also testified that she did not abandon her home-
stead interest and had not established a new homestead. The ex-husband,
who had been attempting to sell the house, was making all current payments
on the mortgage note, and it was agreed that he would have credit for half
the reduction of principal of the indebtedness in the division of the proceeds.
The court concluded that the ex-wife of the childless marriage lost her
homestead rights as a result of the divorce.116 A more precise way of put-
ting the point is to say that, as a result of the divorce by which she lost any
foreseeable right of occupancy, the ex-wife of the childless marriage lost her
11. Archibald v. Jacobs, 69 Tex. 248, 251, 6 S.W. 177, 178-79 (1887).
112. Silvers v. Welch, 127 Tex. 58, 62, 91 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1936).
113. In re Bohac, 117 Bankr. 256, 263 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
114. Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 454-55, 119 S.W. 86, 88 (1909). The
father maintained a continuing family in that instance. The father and the children reoccupied
the home after the mother's departure.
115. 112 Bankr. 15 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990).
116. Id. at 17.
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
homestead right. Hence, as a bankrupt, she could not use section 522(f)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code 1 7 to avoid a creditor's judicial lien fixed on her
share of the exempt property. If there had been some reasonable anticipa-
tion that the debtor might resume occupancy of the home, however, the
court's conclusion would have been contrary to principle.'1 8
The business honiestead, if asserted, is an integral part of the residential
homestead which may include a residence and a place of business, or either.
The same rules apply to both types of use.'" 9 A person may claim only one
residential homestead and may assert only one place of business as ex-
empt 120 along with such outlying areas that are necessary for the operation
of the business.' 2' The residential and business homestead are also subject
to the same rules with respect to mortgage: 1) the same constitutional limi-
tations apply with respect to the purposes for which a valid lien may be put
on the homestead property, 122 and 2) the same formalities of spousal joinder
are applicable for fixing a lien on the property.123
Well established law provides that if the owner of a mobile home affixes it
to realty in which the owner has a property interest, even a month-to-month
tenancy, the home is protected from seizure as a homestead.' 24 It was re-
cently asserted that the adherence of personalty to realty as a fixture allows
the avoidance of a prior lien put on a portable building before the building
was fixed on the realty and occupied as a home. The argument was rejected
in In re Brown. 125 The lien does not lose its efficacy merely because the
building is affixed to realty.
E. Liens on Homesteads
The usual means of circumventing the prohibition of mortgage of a home-
stead as security for other purposes than those allowed by the Texas Consti-
tution 126 is to convey the home to a corporation owned by the homeowner.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
118. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw.
L.J. 1, 18-20 (1986) (discussing In re Claflin, 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985)).
119. See McSwain, The Texas Business Homestead in 1990, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 657, 681-
686 (1990).
120. In re Webb, 4 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 344, 346 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
121. In re Krug, 102 Bankr. 98, 99 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); Ford v. Aetna Ins. Co., 424
S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1968).
122. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973).
123. In re Moore, 110 Bankr. 255, 258 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). For an earlier stage of
this dispute, see In re Moore, 93 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988), discussed in McKnight,
supra note 71, at 19-20.
124. Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), writ ref'd
n.r.e. sub nom. Love v. Hoffman, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
125. 4 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 204, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); see also In re Brown, 4 Tex.
Bankr. Ct. Rep. 203, 204 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
126. TEx. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973). In April, 1990 the Texas Re-
search League issued its study of arguments for and against amending the Texas Constitution
to allow mortgages of an owner's equity in a home. Texas Research League, The Texas Home-
stead Lat-Intrusive Anachronism or Venerable Safeguard?, 11 ANALYSIS 1 (No. 4, 1990). In
October, 1990 the federal Congress rejected proposed legislation allowing the federal govern-
ment to fix and foreclose a lien on homesteads for the non-payment of student loans, veterans'
loans, and loans made by financial institutions in the hands of federal authorities.
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The corporation then mortgages the home and makes the loan proceeds
available to the use of the former owner. The corporation is not precluded
from mortgaging a home, because it cannot claim a homestead.
In In re Rubarts'27 a potential inroad was made on the effectiveness of
this common practice. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that if
the lender knows that the transfer to the corporation is merely a means of
circumventing the constitutional mortgage-prohibition and the occupant of
premises intends to stay in possession, the mortgage is void.'12  In Rubarts
the court recognized that a homestead interest may be terminated by a sale
of the property, but the court concluded that the creditor has the burden of
showing that the sale was not a sham because it is the creditor's burden to
show that the homestead has been terminated. 129 No Texas authority is di-
rectly on point. Although a similar issue is raised in conjunction with a
purchaser's duty of inquiry as to the nature of the seller's title when a former
owner has remained in possession of residential property, the Texas rule in
that situation is rather murky.1 30 Though the Fifth Circuit court's point of
view is not binding on Texas courts, its conclusions are functionally authori-
tative in bankruptcy cases where the issue very commonly arises. But if a
federal entity seeks to foreclose a mortgage involving similar facts, the home-
stead claimant will be barred from asserting a sham transfer arising out of a
side-agreement with the mortgagee under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. 131
In In re Worth 132 the couple's business homestead was awarded on di-
vorce to the husband subject to a lien in the favor of the wife to secure
payment of the husband's note for her community interest in the property.
In his subsequent bankruptcy, the ex-husband sought to avoid the wife's lien
on the business homestead under the provision of the Bankruptcy Code. In
allowing avoidance of a judicial lien for a homestead the congressional
draftsman probably had only creditors' liens in mind as some courts have
held, 133 but a broader interpretation of the provision is consistent with the
language of the Code134 and with the technique of interpreting provisions of
the Code specifically denying discharge of alimony and child support or-
ders. 135 Paradoxically the judicial lien arising from a familial or fiduciary
relationship is the only type of judicial lien that will reach a homestead in
127. 896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1990).
128. Id. at 115.
129. Id. at 110-11.
130. See Moore v. Chamberlain, 109 Tex. 64, 195 S.W. 1135 (1917); Ramirez v. Smith, 94
Tex. 184, 59 S.W. 258 (1900); Love v. Breedlove, 75 Tex. 649, 13 S.W. 222 (1890); Hurt v.
Cooper, 63 Tex. 362 (1885); Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315 (1883).
131. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460-61
(1942); Templin v. Weisgram, 867 F.2d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 63(1989).
132. 100 Bankr. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
133. See In re Boyd, 741 F.2d 1112, 1113-114 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11,
12 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1983).
134. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1990, cert. granted).
135. Exclusio unius est exclusio alterius. See In re Pederson, 78 Bankr. 264, 267 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Duncan, 85 Bankr. 80, 83 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
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Texas, for if realty is exempt, an ordinary judgment creditor's lien will not
attach to it. Further, the only question that needs to be answered in Texas is
whether the property subject to the alleged lien is a homestead. If the prop-
erty is a homestead, a judicial lien in favor of a creditor will not fix on the
property and there is no need for recourse to the Bankruptcy Code. In
Worth the court gave a literal reading to the section, but still managed to
preserve the lien. 136 The court reasoned, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had done 37 with respect to the Texas personal property exemptions,1 38
that only the unencumbered portion of the property is exempt. 139 Hence,
the part subject to the lien was not exempt property, and, therefore, the lien
was not subject to avoidance. 4
A more troublesome instance of interaction of federal and state law arises
from the provisions of federal banking laws. It has been asserted that141 the
federal Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA)142 and regulations issued
under it 43 allow federally chartered savings and loan associations to take a
mortgage on a Texas homestead for purposes forbidden by the Texas Consti-
tution. 144 Although the Texas Attorney General is not persuaded that the
federal law has the effect asserted, 145 his opinion is not as convincing as
might be desired. The Attorney General's conclusion is just as unconvincing
that the federal Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 (Par-
ity Act)146 does not extend similar authority to state-chartered savings and
loan associations. 47 Federal legislation may be the only available means of
curing the disquieting effects of HOLA and the Parity Act.
F Exempt Personalty
In In re Sugarek 148 a bankrupt had chosen federal exemptions and sought
to remove non-possessory, non-purchase money liens from tools of trade.149
Although the encumbered portions of Texas personal property exemptions
are construed as non-exempt, 50 a lien that impairs a federally defined ex-
emption may be avoided. 151 The court construed the federal reference to
136. Worth, 100 Bankr. 834, 840.
137. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 3836, repealed and replaced by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 42.001(c) (Vernon 1991); see McKnight, Texas Family Exemption Laws, 21 Tex. Tech L.
Rev. 1121, 1143 (1990).
138. In re Allen, 725 F.2d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 293.
140. Worth, 100 Bankr. 834-39.
141. Letter of Deputy General Counsel of Home Loan Bank Board to Associate General
Counsel of Department of Housing and Urban Development (Aug. 4, 1989), cited in Op. Tex.
Att'y Gen. No. JM-1269 (1990).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(E) (1988).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 545; 48 Fed. Reg. 23,032-33 (May 23, 1983).
144. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973).
145. Op. Tex. Att'y. Gen. No. JM-1269 (1990).
146. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (1988).
147. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1269.
148. 117 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (1988).
150. In re Allen, 725 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B) (1988).
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tools of trade to include large agricultural implements 52 contrary to con-
gressional legislative history153 and some Texas authority giving the concept
a more limited meaning. 154
Unpaid wages are exempt from seizure under both the Texas Constitu-
tion 1 " and the Property Code,156 but money due to an independent contrac-
tor for services is not construed as wages and is therefore unprotected.15 7
Although it has been suggested that the Texas personal property exemptions
be expanded to cover money due for some personal services, there is no sig-
nificant sentiment to extend exemptions to cover debts due to all independ-
ent contractors.1 5
8
When directing an employee-debtor to turnover wages as they are re-
ceived, a turnover order goes to, but does not cross, the line laid down by the
Texas Constitution forbidding seizure of wages in the hands of an employer.
Enforcing a turnover order by civil contempt, however, would impinge on
that constitutional prohibition against garnishment of wages. Without rul-
ing on the latter point, in Raborn v. Davis 159 the Texas Supreme Court sus-
tained the valiity of an order to turnover wages as received. After a motion
for rehearing was filed, however, the parties settled their dispute and the
court dismissed the case as moot.160 In its dismissal the court observed that
the parties had not argued the effect of the statute, effective on June 15,
1989,161 making turnover orders inapplicable to a judgment rendered before
or after that date except with respect to the payment of child-support obliga-
tions. Thus the court must give further consideration to the validity of or-
ders to turnover wages to satisfy a 1987 judgment.162 In the meantime the
Texarkana appellate court had followed Raborn in affirming a turnover or-
152. Sugarek, 117 Bankr. at 274.
153. Id. at 273; see also In re Trainer, 56 Bankr. 21, 23 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (large truck
and trailer not tool of trade of trucker).
154. See, e.g., Willis v. Morris, 66 Tex. 628, 633-34 1 S.W. 799, 801-02 (1886). But see
Green v. Raymond, 58 Tex. 80, 84 (1882). For a discussion of both lines of authority, see Olds
& Palmer, Exempt Property in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TExAS 23, 51-54 (J. McKnight ed.
1963).
155. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (1876).
156. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(8) (Vernon 1984). Because unpaid wages are con-
stitutionally exempt from seizure by creditors, they are not subject to inclusion in the statuto-
rily exempt amount allowed for a family or single adult. Sloan v. Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436,
442 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. In re Martin, 117 Bankr. 243, 246 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Perciavalle, 92
Bankr. 688, 689-90 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
158. A general revision and clarification of Title 42 of the Texas Property Code was passed
by both houses of the Texas Legislature at the regular session of 1989. In the House bill (H.B.
2763) "commissions for personal services" were designated as exempt from creditors' seizure,
whereas in the Senate bill (S.B. 400) "current income from personal service contracts" was
defined as exempt. This inconsistency and others had not been resolved at the end of the
legislative session. Thus, neither provision was enacted.
159. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 633 (1990).
160. Id. at 634.
161. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 1991).




der affecting wages without considering the effect of the 1989 statute. 163
In 1987 the Texas Legislature enacted Property Code section 42.0021164
to exempt a broad range of pension and retirement interests without mone-
tary limitation. More reported decisions have subsequently dealt with this
type of exemption than any other. 165 The scope of the Texas statute includes
interests which qualify under the federal Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA) 166 as well as retirement devices such as individ-
ual retirement accounts and certain Keogh plans, which are beyond the
control of ERISA.
The bankruptcy courts have been most concerned with ERISA-qualifying
plans, and the courts have analyzed the effects of the Texas statute in nota-
bly different ways. Some have concluded that ERISA preempts the entire
field of pension plans qualifying under it, and thus leaves no room for the
operation of Texas law with respect to exemption of ERISA-qualifying inter-
ests. In spite of the breadth of ERISA-preemption of matters associated
with retirement interests, adherence to this view seems to be waning. 167 The
United States Supreme Court has recently stressed its own recognition of
limits to ERISA's preemption clause. 68 A second view accepts the preemp-
tive effect of ERISA with respect to ERISA-qualifying plans but goes on to
treat ERISA as creating a type of federal non-bankruptcy exemption recog-
nized by section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code 169 and hence avail-
able to a debtor who chooses state rather than federal bankruptcy
exemptions. The Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Texas
reached this conclusion in In re Komet, 170 and that view was followed in two
later cases. 171 Other courts have enunciated a third view: Although ERISA
creates pension interests dealt with by the Texas act, the subject matter is
not preempted by the federal statute and thus the federal and state statutes
can operate together. 172 Hence, the Texas act is fully effective to exempt its
subject matter which will therefore qualify as exempt property under section
522 of the Bankruptcy Code. In reviewing decisions of bankruptcy judges
163. Schmerbeck v. River Oaks Bank, 786 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1990, no
writ) (Grant, J., concurring with great reluctance on basis of stare decisis).
164. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1991), as clarified and amended in
1989.
165. For previous developments, see Hendrick, Federal Nonbankruptcy Law Includes ER-
ISA, 53 TEX. BAR J. 854 (1990); Comment, Protecting ERISA Plans in Bankruptcy: Is There
Still Hope for Texas Debtors?, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 757 (1990).
166. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp. 1990).
167. For an example of this view, see In re Deisher, 4 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 90, 94 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1990).
168. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, I11 S.Ct. 478, 483 (1990). The court nevertheless
held that an action by an employee for wrongful discharge under state law was preempted by
ERISA because discharge was based on the employer's desire to avoid making contributions to
an ERISA-qualifying pension fund for the benefit of the employee. Id. at 486.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
170. 104 Bankr. 799, 805-16 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
171. In re Felts, 114 Bankr. 131, 133-34 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Majul, 119 Bankr.
118, 124 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
172. See Hendrick, supra note 165, at 855-56.
[Vol. 45
FAMILY LAW HUSBAND AND WIFE
two federal District courts expressed this view. In In re Dyke 173 the court
concluded that the Texas exemption statute is beyond the preemptive reach
of ERISA 174 because an exemption is not sufficiently "related to" ERISA to
be preempted by it.175 Thus, section 42.0021 simply adds another property
exemption to the already established list and "(t]he fact that the property
interest is a retirement plan, the administration of which is regulated by ER-
ISA, is of no moment." 176 A similar conclusion was reached in In re
Volpe. 17
In Volpe the court also considered the application of section 42.0021 to
seven individual retirement accounts which are clearly beyond the scope of
ERISA. Because section 42.0021 refers to "an individual retirement ac-
count" the court was at pains to construe the debtor's separate accounts as
but one plan and therefore exempt.1 78 The court's ingenuity is overstrained.
Because the Texas statute does not deal with an enumeration of items and
because there is no applicable monetary limit, the reference to "an account"
should be construed as "any account" in the context of the statute.
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. Jurisdiction
In Redus v. Redus 179 the Austin Court of Appeals considered the validity
of a foreign state judgment with respect to personal property of the petition-
ing husband when the wife was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court. In Fox v. Fox 180 the same court had the same issue before it with
respect to the validity of a Texas order made without personal jurisdiction of
the foreign respondent. Without mentioning its earlier decision, but evi-
dently aware of the adverse criticism of it,""1 the Austin court concluded in
Redus that the California divorce court lacked jurisdiction to divide personal
property without jurisdiction over the respondent.182 The Corpus Christi
appellate court resolved a somewhat similar jurisdictional dispute in Rami-
rez v. Lagunes.1 83 The court concluded that a Texas court lacking personal
jurisdiction over an ex-husband could not entertain a bill of discovery di-
rected toward finding the moveable assets of a non-domiciliary, divorced by
a foreign court.18 4 But if a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over a re-
spondent in a suit for divorce, the court may enjoin the respondent from
173. 119 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990), rev'g 99 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
174. Id. at 539.
175. Id. at 537-39.
176. Id.
177. 120 Bankr. 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'g 100 Bankr. 840, 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989).
178. Id.
179. 794 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
180. 559 S.W.2d 407 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
181. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw.
L.J. 109, 121-22 (1978).
182. Redus, 794 S.W.2d at 419-20.
183. 794 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
184. Id. at 504.
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filing a similar suit in another state or nation.' 85
Once a respondent to a petition for divorce has made an appearance, he is
entitled to notice of a trial setting as a matter of due process. In the absence
of such notice, the court cannot grant a divorce by default. 186 If the respon-
dent is represented by counsel at a trial, however, he cannot be said to have
defaulted in making an appearance.' 87
B. Interlocutory Orders
Since the enactment of the first divorce act of 1841, the Texas divorce
court has been empowered to grant temporary spousal support during the
pendency of the suit.'8 8 By an extension of that principle, the court may
order one spouse to make mortgage payments on the family home as a part
of spousal support.' 89 For enforcement of such an order by civil contempt
the order requiring performance must be clear but need not conform to the
exacting statutory standards' 90 of a child-support order. 19'
In Chiles v. Schuble ' 92 the wife sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
trial court to enforce temporary support orders by contempt. The appellate
court responded that it could not compel the trial court "to reach a result
that necessarily involves his discretion", but the trial court must nonetheless
entertain the motion and hold a hearing.' 93
C. Agreements Incident to Divorce
In Smith v. Smith 194 the husband and wife entered into a written property
settlement including variations by written addenda executed prior to their
divorce. The ex-wife later denied the validity of the addenda because they
were not reduced to writing by the court reporter and introduced into the
record. The court held, however, that Rule 11195 was complied with by
reading the addenda in open court and being entered in the record.' 96 In
another case 197 the ex-wife resisted enforcement of the terms of a property
settlement agreement requiring her to contribute to discharge liabilities in-
curred during marriage because the ex-husband might have asserted a de-
fense to the enforcement of the obligation but chose not to do so. Because
the agreement did not require the ex-husband to avail himself of the defense,
185. Espada Garrido v. Iglesias de Espada, 785 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990, no writ).
186. Vining v. Vining, 782 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no
writ).
187. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989).
188. 1840-1841 Republic of Texas Laws, 5th Cong. 19, § Bat 21, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 483, 485 (1898).
189. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1975).
190. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.33 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
191. Ex parte Graham, 787 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990).
192. 788 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
193. Id. at 207.
194. 794 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
195. TEx. R. Civ. P. 11.
196. Smith, 794 S.W.2d at 827.
197. Bass v. Bass, 790 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
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the terms of the agreement were binding on the ex-wife. 198
In Wesley v. Pickard 199 the divorce property settlement agreement of 1983
provided that the husband would pay contractual alimony for ten years and
that it would be binding upon his estate through February 1, 1985. The ex-
husband made all payments in accordance with the agreement until his
death in 1987. The court held that the only reasonable interpretation of the
agreement was that in the event of the ex-husband's death, his estate would
have no further obligation to pay beyond the time specified.20° A less spe-
cific agreement was before the court in Alexander v. Alexander.201 The set-
tlement agreement provided that in case of litigation concerning breach of
the agreement the prevailing party would be entitled to his or her attorney's
fees. The dispute occurred after the ex-husband's death. The court held that
in the absence of a specific term of the agreement, only the ex-husband, but
not his estate, was bound by this provision. 20 2
In Traylor v. Traylor203 the Texarkana appellate court commented on an
ex-wife's effort to clarify a divorce decree incorporating a property settle-
ment agreement by which her former husband undertook to provide her
with medical insurance. The appellate court concluded that because the or-
der to provide insurance was not referable to the division of community
property, it was not the sort of order a divorce court could have made, and
therefore the court could not enforce it through its contempt powers.204 For
the same reason2 5 such a provision cannot be enforced under section
3.72.206 The language of the agreement did not lend itself to enforcement as
a contract to pay a sum of money, but the court suggested that such a con-
tractual term could have been included in the agreement and could therefore
have been enforced as a contractual obligation. 20 7
The scope of judicial construction is restricted when the law of judgments
rather than the law of contracts is applicable to determine the meaning of a
divorce decree. In Haworth P. Haworth 208 the ex-husband asked the court to
clarify a judgment which did not embody an agreement incident to divorce.
The parties merely signed the court's decree to approve its form and such
approval does not cause the decree to be an agreed judgmentY°9 In constru-
ing such a judgment the court looks to the language of the court in the light
of the record but cannot inquire of the intentions of the parties.210 The 1980
198. Id. at 117-18.
199. 783 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
200. Id. at 591-92.
201. 784 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
202. Id. at 114.
203. 789 S.W.2d 701 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
204. Id. at 703. Although the dispute did not involve a property settlement agreement, the
types of orders a trial court can make are discussed in Reiter v. Reiter, 788 S.W.2d 201, 202-04
(rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
205. Traylor, 789 S.W.2d at 703.
206. Trx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.72 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
207. Traylor, 789 S.W.2d at 703-04.
208. 795 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1990, no writ).




divorce decree before the court had been drawn too broadly to grant the wife
separate property interests of the husband arising after the divorce. But to
rectify that error would have required a modification, not a mere clarifica-
tion of the decree. 211 Thus the decree was required to stand as entered.
In Spradley v. Hutchison 21 2 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reiterated
its decision in Herbert v. Herbert21 3 that although a property settlement
agreement is interpreted by the law of contracts rather than the law of judg-
ments, a contract defense cannot be pled against the enforcement of a judg-
ment.21 4 Such contractual defenses may nevertheless be considered in fixing
damages for breach.215
In making a division of marital property, a divorce court may grant a
custodial parent occupancy of the separate family home of the other parent
as an element of child support,216 but such a divestiture of separate property
cannot extend beyond the period for which the property owner owes a duty
of child-support. 217 By the terms of the settlement agreement approved by
the court in de los Santos v. de los Santos,218 the husband and wife parti-
tioned their community home in separate undivided shares. During the mi-
nority of the children the wife was to have possession of the home and
thereafter the house would be sold and the proceeds divided. The husband
was to pay $200 a month as child-support. Three years after the divorce the
ex-wife moved for an increase in child-support to $500 a month. That pro-
ceeding was compromised by a further agreement by which the ex-husband
would continue to pay only $200 a month for child-support, and he would
transfer his interest in the property to his ex-wife in lieu of any increase in
child support. Two years later the ex-wife sought a further increase in child
support. The validity of the modification agreement was in issue. The court
held that the parties' effort to modify the child-support order was void on
two grounds. 219 First, the court itself, as well as the parties, lacks power to
modify child-support provisions of a judicially approved property settlement
agreement that sets aside real property for the benefit of minor children. 220
Second, an agreement to forbear from seeking child-support in exchange for
title to realty is an unenforceable agreement. 221
211. Id. at 300 (relying on TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.71(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
212. 787 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
213. 699 S.W.2d 717, 725-26 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 754
S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1987).
214. Spradley, 787 S.W.2d at 220.
215. Id; see Giddings v. Giddings, 701 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
216. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. 1977).
217. Id. at 139; see Lambourn v. Lambourn, 787 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court lacked power to order parent to maintain life insurance
policy for non-disabled child until child reached age twenty-two).
218. 794 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
219. Id. at 529-30.
220. Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971,
no writ).
221. Galaznik v. Galaznik, 685 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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D. Property Not Subject to Division
In Berry v. Berry222 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the Uniform
Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) 223 does not apply to di-
visions of marital property on divorce made prior to its enactment. The
doctrine of res judicata controls in that situation. Similarly, in Baxter v.
Ruddle224 the Texas Supreme Court held that an unappealed 1978 award of
a specific percentum of subsequent retirement benefits was not affected by a
1983 decision of the Texas Supreme Court22" that divorce benefits should be
calculated at the date of divorce.226
The ex-wife in Adams v. Adams 227 asserted a right in her ex-husband's
military retirement benefits undivided by a Tennessee divorce decree in
1975. Under Tennessee law such undivided marital property is subject to
partition. The court concluded that military retirement benefits arising after
June 25, 1981 2 8 in accordance with the USFSPA were subject to parti-
tion.229 Whether federal Veterans Administration benefits are subject to di-
vision under Texas law under the USFSPA was not before the court in either
case. In Gallegos v. Gallegos,230 however, the issue was before the San
Antonio appellate court. The court held that the amount by which military
retirement benefits are reduced by acceptance of Veterans Administration
disability pay is not subject to division by a Texas divorce court.231 The
court also concluded that the amount by which military retirement benefits
are reduced to receive current wages from the federal Civil Service is also not
subject to division.232
E. Making the Division
The divorce court has very wide discretion in dividing the marital estate
and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, an appellate court will not
disturb the trial court's division.233 Although the division of property in
Mullins v. Mullins234 was very much in favor of the wife and the trial judge's
remarks "border[ed] on being abusive and threatening, ' 235 the appellate
court was unable to say that the property division was improper in the ab-
222. 786 S.W.2d 672, 673 (rex. 1990). Elliott v. Elliott, 797 S.W.2d 388, 391-92 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, no writ), resolved a similar point. I
223. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988); see Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
224. 794 S.W.2d 761 (rex. 1990).
225. Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
226. Id. at 946.
227. 787 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
228. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
229. Adams, 787 S.W.2d at 623-24.
230. 788 S.W.2d 158 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
231. Id. at 160.
232. Id. at 161.
233. See In re Marriage of D,M,B, and R.L.B., 798 S.W.2d 399, 406 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1990, no writ); Martin v. Martin, 797 S.W.2d 347, 351 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ);
Laprade v. Laprade, 784 S.W.2d 490, 494 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
234. 785 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).




sence of findings of fact and conclusions of law.236 But when the trial court
makes an error in the characterization of marital property of any signifi-
cance, the appellate court remands the matter for a redivision. 237
The award of attorney's fees is an integral part of a property division on
divorce.238 Although it is improper for an attorney to seek a judgment for a
legal fee against his own client in a divorce proceeding, 239 a former attorney
of a client may intervene to seek recovery. Though the wife in Rossen v.
Rossen 240 had not preserved her point of error with respect to the award of
attorney's fees to her former attorney who had not formally intervened, Jus-
tice Dunn was nevertheless troubled that the decree included an order that
the wife pay a fee to an attorney who had represented her in the suit.241 It
appears that the wife's prior attorney was allowed to withdraw toward the
end of the trial, and another attorney replaced him.242 The wife's former
attorney was therefore a party for the purpose of receiving an award of fees
and was bound by any earlier negotiations with respect to fees.243 The trial
court, therefore, properly treated the wife's former attorney as a party in
awarding his fees.
On December 13 the parties in Hollaway v. Hollaway2 " announced that
they had reached a settlement, and the terms of the agreement were dictated
to the court reporter in open court. On being asked by the judge, each party
expressed satisfaction with the agreement. The record showed that the judge
then stated
I'll grant the Divorce and approve the settlement. It's on the Record. I
will approve the settlement in January. However, it's my intention the
Divorce is rendered today. The signing of the Decree will merely be a
ministerial act. Because it's over with and done. The agreement is en-
tirely dictated on the Record.245
At a hearing on January 10 to sign the judgment, the wife attempted to
repudiate the property settlement agreement in which she said that her par-
ticipation had been coerced. The trial judge stated that he had already ren-
dered a final judgment.246 The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's
ruling that final judgment had been rendered on December 13.247
236. Id. at 9-10, 12.
237. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); see Welder v. Welder, 794 S.W.2d
420, 434 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Whether a new trial will be necessary
will depend on the circumstances of each case. See Halbert v. Halbert, 794 S.W.2d 535, 536-37
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
238. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
239. Texas Ethics Committee Opinion No. 374, 37 TEx. BAR J. 1085 (1974).
240. 792 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
241. Id. at 279-80.
242. Id. at 278-79.
243. See Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins v. Dawson, 478 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Di-
vorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 459-60 (1976).
244. 792 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] writ denied).
245. Id. at 169.
246. Id. For the consequence of a premature motion for new trial in a divorce context, see
Syn-Labs, Inc. v. Franz, 778 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
247. Hollaway, 792 S.W.2d 168, 170.
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A court's plenary jurisdiction to set aside the judgment expires thirty days
after its entry.248 In Valencia v. Valencia24 9 the divorce court awarded the
family home to the wife along with custody of the parties' child. 250 The
court ordered the husband to pay child-support of $100 a month, but be-
cause his community share of the equity in the house was $15,000, the court
gave the husband credit for 150 semi-monthly child-support payments in
advance.251 A subsequent change of custody was granted to the father, and
the mother was ordered on sale of the house to repay $13,100 previously
credited to her from the husband's share of the equity; the court put a lien
on the house to secure repayment. 2" 2 The appellate court held that the trial
court had exceeded its powers under Family Code section 3.71(a)253 which
specifically provides that the court may not modify the division of property
in the divorce decree. 254 The mother could have been ordered to pay child
support but putting the lien on her realty was beyond the court's power.255
F. Effect of Bankruptcy
In In re Biggs 25 6 the husband and wife had entered into an agreement
incident to divorce in which the husband obligated himself to pay contrac-
tual alimony each month. After the ex-husband became delinquent in his
payments, the ex-wife recovered a money judgment for the amount in ar-
rears.257 The ex-husband then filed a petition in bankruptcy and asserted
that his obligation under the agreement and judgment were dischargeable
because Texas divorce courts cannot award permanent alimony, which
would be non-dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.2 58 But contractual
alimony has been long recognized in Texas, 259 and if the agreed payments
are meant for support rather than as elements of a property division,264 the
contractual obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 261
248. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b; see Anderson v. Anderson, 786 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990, no writ); Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no
writ).
249. 792 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ).
250. Id. at 566.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.71(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
254. Valencia, 792 S.W.2d at 567.
255. Id.
256. 907 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1990).
257. Id.
258. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) (1988).
259. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967).
260. See In re Benich, 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987); Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 85
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
261. Biggs, 907 F.2d at 506.
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